GENERAL THEORY OF APPORTIONMENT
ALFRED DE GRAZIA*

Apportionment is the division of a population into constituencies whose electors
are to be charged with the selection of public officers. Since it is' difficult to know at
all times, and to calculate in terms of, the precise number of actual voters, registered
voters, or qualified electors in the districts created by apportionment, systems of
apportionment commonly use the total population as the numerical basis of division.
An example of an attempt to do otherwise is the unenforced second section of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It decrees that
any state restricting the adult male suffrage of its inhabitants shall have its allotment
of seats in Congress reduced by the proportion of the restriction to the total adult
male population of the state.
To be inclusive in our concept of apportionment, we may regard constituencies
of the whole state or nation as single-district apportionments, and we may also consider informal, non-legal divisions of the electorate as apportionments. However,
it is generally understood that the central problems of apportionment arise from the
determination of the constituencies of legislative assemblies. Therefore, save in the
case of a district of the whole state or nation, apportionment is invariably a recognition
or solicitation of separatist groupings in a society. Some statesmen and writers,
among them Rousseau, Gambetta, and a number of leading eighteenth century
revolutionaries in America, England, and France, believed apportionment only a
necessary evil. Forced to admit the demand and need for apportionment, they sometimes tried to cancel its effects. For instance, the French Constitution of 1793, after
providing territorial apportionment, solemnly declared that the "representatives
elected in the departments are not representatives of a particular department, but of
the entire nation, and they must not be given any mandate." This miracle, however,
did not appear. History could not have given hope of it then nor can it now. Apportionment in some form remains an absolute requirement of representative government. And apportionment is separatistic in design and effects, just as are other
stages in the process of representation.
Apportionment exchanges another important feature with the process of representation. A criterion of apportionment always contains a value. Representation is
a relationship between a designated official and a citizen in which the actions of the
official accord with the desires of the citizen. The relationship is a particular one,
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varying among individuals, and no device of representation extends to all persons
equally. Every step in the process of granting representation to a citizen or group
of citizens is a controversial one. From the determination of who shall vote to the
provisions for control of the representative after he has been elected, the process of
representation is subjected to a struggle over values, so that ultimately the system
of representation favors in each detail some citizens over others, or extracts for
favorable attention in policy-making certain attributes of individuals rather than
other attributes. No system of apportionment and no system of suffrage, balloting,
or counting is neutral. The process of apportionment, like the other stages in the
process of representation, is a point of entry for preferred social values. The existing
system of apportionment, whether legal, illegal, or extra-legal, institutionalizes the
values of some group in a society.
An examination of the criteria by which constituencies are divided may clarify the
meaning of the foregoing remarks. The criteria underlying a system of apportionment consist of one or more of the following: territorial surveys; governmental boundaries; official bodies; functional divisions of the population; and free population
alignments. Of these five criteria, territorial surveys are most common in modern
times. "Artificial" areas are cut out of the map and their populations serve as constituencies. Historically this method of creating constituencies has been associated
with the rise of egalitarian democracy 1 The territorial survey is resorted to in
order to divide the population into contiguous districts composed of equal numbers
of voters. Since this criterion is so widely used and involves the most important current problems, its discussion may be postponed until the other criteria are described
and analyzed.
Apportionment by governmental boundaries is a part of all apportionment
systems. The constituency of a nationally elective officer is the nation and the constituency of a local government executive is often the total electorate of his city or
village. Thus the Argentine president is elected by direct popular vote of the
nation; the American governor is elected by the voters of his state as a whole; and
an American mayor is often elected by the total electorate of the city. This constituency of the whole is important politically if only because the officer acquires a
large increment of prestige and authority from expressing sometimes the desires and
sentiments of the collectivity of voters. Theodore Roosevelt wrote that "the executive
is or ought to be peculiarly representative of the people as a whole."
Corporate or collegial bodies, such as the American state legislatures, also use the
criterion of governmental boundaries in apportioning seats. A favored device of
early American state governments was to apportion seats solely according to the
county and town boundaries in one or both houses of the state legislature.3 This
procedure was abandoned in most state governments, since it invariably and openly
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worked to the disadvantage of governmental units of heavy population density.
Yet it is well to note that in a number of cases where the major criterion of apportionment is the territorial survey, the law may require some attention to the boundaries of existing units of government in drawing district lines4
In late medieval times, governmental boundaries were the favored criteria in the
representative governments that were then developing. In England corporate towns
or boroughs that were so privileged by royal grant and the historic counties were
each entitled to send two members to the House of Commons. Federal governments
such as the United States are outstanding exemplifications of the use of governmental boundaries. Each state in the American union is authorized two United
States senators, regardless of size or population. Until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, the criterion of governmental boundaries was supplemented by
the requirement of election by the state legislatures.
Election by the state legislature constituted a second criterion of apportionment
which overlapped with the state-wide character of the office. It could be called
apportionment in terms of official bodies. The apportionment of the American
Senate was not unique in this respect, however. The electoral college that serves
in law as the constituency of the president is another example of such an official
body. However, whereas the state legislatures were standing bodies, the electoral
college is an ad hoc agency, created specifically to elect the president. Both the
permanent and ad hoc types are found as the electing agents elsewhere. The French
system of indirect elections of the national Senate and of the present day Council
of the Republic have been founded upon electoral colleges composed of various
officials and persons designated by local councils. The French system took much
of its original inspiration from Condorcet who was an admirer of the American
system of electing the president. The criterion used to create the apportionment
is that the electors be previously designated to an agency charged with the elective
function. When creating such special constituencies of a collegial body, the expectation is that the new constituencies will differ remarkably from their own constituencies, that they will be less rash, more discerning, and more knowledgeable.
However, many more executive leaders or single officials are elected indirectly than
are collegial bodies. The English prime minister, the European premiers, the
burgermeisters, and the town managers are examples. The double apportionment

of constituencies required of the indirect election of each member of a collegial
body seems most often to be uneconomical and cumbersome, apart from its unpopular slant. Hence the ad hoc form is rarely used. More common is the use of a
lower house to elect an upper house, or to create cabinets and councils, as exemplified
so abundantly in the Russian hierarchy of soviets and presidia.
A fourth criterion by which constituencies may be cut out of a given population is by functional divisions. Functional groupings are non-territorial aggregates
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of persons who share social or economic interests. The degree of cohesion of the
aggregates may vary widely, and different systems of apportionment of a functional
kind make differing allowances for such varying cohesion. Thus, an ancient and
persisting example of apportionment is by social estates. The early parliaments of
the thirteenth century included, besides the commons, the estates of the nobility
and clergy, sometimes organized separately and sometimes together. A fairly rigid
class system stratified the population for purposes of apportionment. A much looser
type of recognition of functional differences in apportionment is that which assigns
representatives to localities on the basis of the amount of taxes the locality pays.
For example, under the French Constitution of 1793 each department was allotted
a basic minimum of representatives in the National Assembly, then allotted additional seats according to its population, and finally allotted seats according to the total
taxes it paid. This last provision of the Constitution benefited the wealthier regions,
and presumably indirectly the wealthier classes. In South Carolina from i8o8 until
the Civil War, a system quite similar prevailed in the apportionment for the lower
house. One-half the total delegates were assigned to the districts and parishes in
proportion to the whole population and the other half in proportion to the average
of taxes paid for the ten years preceding the decennial reapportionmentsO The preWorld War I Prussian system of apportionment assigned representation on the basis of
taxation also. The largest taxpayers, paying one-third of the total taxes, obtained the
right to elect one third of the delegates to the Landtag, the middle tax-paying group
another third, and the lowest another third. The top group consisted of about 6
per cent of the total electorate. In the American Constitutional Convention of 1787,
consideration was given to the possibility of allocating representation according to,
the taxes paid by a state, but, partly because tax-paying areas were believed to coincide
with areas of high population density, population was chosen as the basis for representation.
Many other forms of apportionment based on functional groups have been employed. Not only estates and tax-paying groups but also nationality groups, university groups, professional groups, factory groups, and general occupational groups
have been used as the criteria. Thus in Moravia, after World War I, the Germans
and Czechs were given each a number of seats and cross-nationality voting was forbidden, and Turks and Jews were represented specially in the Greek Parliament.
The English universities used to be represented by their own constituencies, as did
William and Mary College once in the United States. Professional groups have
sent representatives to the Greek, Hungarian, and Italian legislatures at one
time and the practice continues in Ireland and Portugal. Russian factories until
1936 sent delegates to the local soviets or councils, that in turn elected the delegates
to higher councils. Under the Fascist regime in Italy, the Chamber of Corporations
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was a national legislature based on constituencies composed of major occupations.
This was the most complete attempt to this date to practice functional apportionment exclusive of territorial influences. The closest legal approximation to the
Fascist Chamber in America has been the various authorities acting under the
National Industrial Recovery Administration that, from [933 to 1935, gave certain
powers over prices, wage and work standards, and fair trade practices to groups
composed of the delegates of the various firms of different industries.
A final criterion of apportionment is free population alignments. Advocates of
this criterion deem it unjust to force constituencies out of social criteria such as
geography or social estate or property. Rather, individuals ought themselves to
choose their constituency according to whatever their dominant motive may be at
the time of casting their ballot. This criterion is basic to systems of proportional
representation, wherein the free and personal apportionment is joined with a multimember district and a preferential vote to permit the representation of any group
that achieves a quota of votes roughly equivalent to the total district vote divided
by the number of seats to be filled. The criterion cannot be employed in majority
elections. Election of several representatives at large, in which the constituency for
a legislature is a single electorate in its entirety, produces generally a monopoly
representation of the major political grouping of the geographical constituency.
Hence it does not differ from territorial apportionment. The anti-territorial characteristics of free apportionment have not been sufficiently realized. J. Francis
Fisher, an early American inventor of a system of proportional representation, declared that "it is not land, nor the owners of it,
who form our constituencies, but
the citizens generally; and that the opinions, principles, and interests of the people,
which really ought to find expression in their representatives, can never be expected
to conform to any possible territorial division."' But in fact neither the free apportionment of proportional representation, nor any other system of apportionment has been able, in law or in practice, to dissolve the territorial basis for
apportionment. A closer scrutiny of territorial apportionment may reveal the foundations of its strength.
Apportionment by territorial survey, it was noted earlier, has replaced governmental boundaries as the prevailing criterion of apportionment. The survey method
historically increased in use as individualism increased. The English Levellers of
the mid-seventeenth century were the first to demand a mathematical subdivision of
the nation into election districts of equal population. The merchant and commercial
classes did help to break the monopoly over representative government exercised from
the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries by the landed nobility and the untitled landlords, but they did not rationalize the representative system. The egalitarian democrats as typified by the Levellers did. The egalitarian democrats, with many supports of middle class origin to be sure, espoused a theory of representation that cul-
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minated in the individualism of the advocates of proportional representation like
Fisher and John Stuart Mill.
But the egalitarian democrats never went so far as their intellectual leaders, for
their interest base was in agrarianism. Thomas Jefferson, it must be remembered,
was a physiocrat, an agrarian, and then an advocate of individual representation
based on the territorial survey. Territorial representation, with equal representation
to all men, was the ideal formula for a democratic rural society and was espoused as
such by early nineteenth century democrats in America and elsewhere. "Equal
representation," wrote Jefferson to King on November i9, 1819, "is so fundamental
a principle in a true republic that no prejudices can justify its violation because
the prejudices themselves cannot be justified." We cannot now know whether
Jefferson's equally vehement agrarianism and dislike of cities would have changed

his mind, when faced with the necessity either of carrying out the principle of equal
representation and weakening the agrarian interest or else maintaining the pre-

ponderance of the agrarian element and violating his theory of representation.
Apart from its ultimate unagrarian operation when the cities had grown, apportionment by territorial survey, arising as it did out of the demands for individual
equality, did some damage to localism. To maximize local influences, apportionment ought to be based on local units of government, as was originally the case in
a number of American states and is presently the case in several. Then all the
electorate in a given locale, who are possessed already of a degree of solidarity from
economic, social, and political causes, will project that solidarity into the national
or state legislature and reinforce it thereby. Since many "natural" units of local
government are divided or combined in the geometry of apportionment, the full impact of localism on state or national legislatures is less than it might otherwise be.
Nevertheless, territorial surveys that produce, in the language of the Congressional
Apportionment Act of I842 and other enactments, a "contiguous and compact territory containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants,"9 will provide a considerable reflection of local interests. Although the representative will not
Se a mirror of the neighborhood, of what the Italians call "campanilismo" and the
Germans "kirchturmspolitik," the mirroring, as the history of representation shows,
will be vivid enough to cause widespread protests against the loss of a national interest.
And when the representatives, chosen from an apportionment by territorial
survey, convene in a legislature, inevitably a number of them will form blocs
that reflect not only their individual localities, but also more general local interests,
regions, and sections. These interests will be reflected in the policies of the state or
national legislature and the politics of the government. Every American state
with any considerable urban population has undergone protracted conflict between
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rural and urban blocs, often regardless of party lines. Other countries have had the
same experience. The representatives of the old counties of England fought the
borough representatives during the great reapportionment struggles, adding a rural
versus urban conflict to the larger conflict over the inequality of apportionment according to population. 0 The French country interest has frequently ganged up
against Paris and the cities in apportionment struggles.11 In Norway, one long
struggle between rural and urban representatives resulted in a compromise that
placed a fixed apportionment of rural (ioo) and urban (5o ) districts into the
constitution itself.
One cannot expect more generally satisfying results from systems of apportion,
ment other than the territorial survey. Under all systems of apportionment, whatever the criterion used, some influential groupings in the population and some
strong partisan interests will find themselves at odds with the status quo and inclined either to demand changes in the existing system or to work out their own
apportionment schemes outside the law. However, there is little doubt that a flagrant
contradiction between law and practice, such as exists between the legally stipulated
criteria of apportionment and the actual apportionment in a number of American
states, causes great moral uneasiness and discontent. It is one thing to say that any
apportionment system favors some interest or attitude over another, and quite another thing to assert that every kind of manipulation of apportionment is merely
another way of accomplishing this fact, and has no important moral consequences.
American state legislatures, which in this way scarcely vary from many other
legislatures elsewhere, have often relied upon rotten boroughs and gerrymandering
to preserve the existing proportions of seats or to increase the proportion of seats
held by a single party or faction. Rotten boroughs are historical accidents that
give disproportionate weight to the votes of .athinly populated district in relation
to a thickly populated one, despite a prevailing belief that apportionment should be
on the basis of equal populations. Although the American Senate satisfies the first
requirement of the rotten borough it does not satisfy the second, for the Senate
was never supposed to be based on the principle of equal populations. But rotten
boroughs are found in American states, the legislatures of which have failed to
carry out periodic reapportionments in order to adjust the size of districts to population changes. The most populous state legislative district in Illinois, for example, is
about three times the population of the average district, owing to the legislature's
failure since igoi to carry out the apportionment procedure prescribed in the state
constitution.
Gerrymandering, on the other hand, is a positive act of malapportionment. It
is a violation or evasion of law or tradition. Its special character emanates not from
being a biased apportionment (for all apportionments are "biased"), but from its
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disharmony with the legal or conventional order. Any system of apportionment
may be gerrymandered, although some systems, much as the free apportionment of
proportional representation, are more difficult to gerrymander than others. The
gerrymander most commonly observed in American politics understandably affects
the prevailing system of apportionment by territorial survey. A particular gerrymander of a territorial apportionment may violate the stipulated condition that district populations be equal or that district boundaries be drawn solely with reference
to enclosing a contiguous area and population or both. The objective of a gerrymander is to maximize the number of districts returning safe majorities for the
apportioning group and to minimize the number of districts returning safe majorities for the opposition party or faction. The gerrymandering group usually seeks
to draw district boundaries in a way that will concentrate its opponents' votes in as
few districts as possible and will spread its own dependable majorities over as many
districts as possible. Hence the success of a gerrymander depends upon an accurate
knowledge of past voting behavior in the various constituencies and a reliable prediction about voting behavior in the future. Extreme gerrymanders, maximizing
the predictive ability of the dominant faction, are usually prevented not only by
various legal provisions but also by the erring legislators' consciences that provide
generally some modicum of shame and by their fears of exciting too great a popular
resentment.
Shame and fears notwithstanding, the temptation to gerrymander or encourage
rotten boroughs is always present in a legislature, as succeeding articles in this symposium will show.' 3 The gerrymander and rotten boroughs are perversions of
established legal and ideological principle, it is well to emphasize here, and can be
distinguished readily from the more general struggle to achieve social values, of which
the process of apportionment forms part. For instance, the debates in legislatures
over the different mathematical techniques of accomplishing apportionments are not
of the same moral stature. It is known that difficulties occur in apportioning seats
to any legislature in which the number of seats is fixed. In the American Congress,
for example, heated argument has arisen over the problem of assigning each state
the proper quota of seats from the 435 available. What to do with the surplus votes
in each state that simple arithmetic division leaves standing is the crucial question.
As will be shown below, at least five different techniques can be used: the method
of smallest divisors, of the harmonic mean, of equal proportions, of major fractions,
and of greatest divisors.j 4 Each technique of apportionment benefits some states
and hurts others. But the point here is that disagreement over the technique to be
chosen, although it exhibits often the same play of interests as is displayed in debates
over gerrymandering or the general criteria of apportionment, is on a different plane
of values. For here, even given a principle of apportionment to which all would
" Todd, The Apportionment Problem Faced by the States, infra.
1

Willcox, Last Words on the Apportionment Problem, and Schmeckebier, The Method of Equal
Proportions, infra, and cf. SCMIECKEBIER, CONGRESSiONAL APPORTIONMENT (1941).

264

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

agree if they could, mathematical social science cannot provide an exact formula in
accord with one principle. Such disagreement, therefore, may be regarded as a
legitimate contest, to be tolerated as morally different from the contests occurring
over malapportionment and the criteria for basic apportionment.
The chief problem of reapportionment centers about keeping such legitimate
disagreement within bounds. When legislators are responsible directly for reapportionment, they tend to enlarge the scope of dispute beyond the inevitable minimum. Hence reapportionment is increasingly being entrusted to less involved personnel. The several techniques of achieving this greater objectivity will be described
in succeeding articles. Among them are included the constitutional prescription of
the apportionment itself; the constitutional prescription of the exact criteria and
timing of apportionment; the standing legislative enactment that is quasi-selfexecutory; the standing legislative enactment that permits the executive to apportion
if the legislature fails to take action; the initiative and referendum; the political
executive apportionment under constitutional or legislative authority; and the nonpolitical administrative apportionment or judicial apportionment under constitutional
or legislative authority. All these techniques deny with reason that the legislature's
conscience will suffice to provide a necessary reapportionment according to established
and accepted criteria.
The act of apportionment, to summarize the preceding discussion, consists of the
postulation of certain basic values as ones deserving disproportionate influence in the
scheme of representative government, and of carrying them into effect in the division of constituencies. The several criteria and sub-criteria that may be used in
any system of apportionment aim at long-range determination of the policy product
of the government. Conflicting social groups and individual philosophies work
constantly to preserve or change the established basis of apportionment. Basic
changes in criteria of apportionment are part of the great historical revolutions.
When struggle occurs in defiance of established canons, as in the cases of rotten
boroughs and gerrymandering, it excites and fosters on both sides a kind of morality
and behavior that tends to weaken the existing legal order. A basic rule of the game
is being violated. When the struggle extends to the minor benefits of particular
techniques of making an agreed-upon apportionment, only minor moral consequences are involved. This minor conflict of values can be prevented from spreading by various devices to remove temptations from reapportionment. Still the
outstanding fact remains that no act of apportionment, legal or illegal, is neutral
with respect to all men.
This fact is clear even if apportionment is taken to include only the formal or
legal apportioning decisions taken by agencies of the state, such as the legislature.
The fact is more meaningful if one considers the unofficial apportioning that constantly occurs in a society. Whatever the legal system of apportionment, other
criteria will enter the system and modify it. For example, a legislature based
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solely on territorial apportionment will represent a sense of the total community
in various ways. Although there may be some truth in the allegation that legislatures are separatistic by nature, it is nevertheless true in some respects that the

individual legislators are part of the total society, have enduring connections
with it, and are compelled by such internal compulsions and by the external forces
contained in the pressures from their constituencies and other constituencies and
persons to act in terms of some state-wide or national consensus. Similarly, although
a territorial survey may be made Without regard to any principle save territorial
contiguity and equality of population, other interests will make themselves felt.
The most conspicuous example of such interests in American experience is the
pressure group and its lobby. The lobby, practically viewed, is based on a functional
constituency, self-apportioned; the numerous lobbies of a complex society are representative of groups denied the status of legal constituencies.' 5
Also, the political process, reacting to the legal system of apportionment, subapportions the people of a society. For example the technique of a balanced
ticket, so common in American politics, overcomes the local territorial effects of the
apportionment by survey by recognizing functional groupings in the society and

apportioning candidates among them. Thus, within a given territorial district, a
balanced ticket may include, as candidates for the various offices to be filled, persons
from certain occupational groups, religions, income levels, nationalities, and right or
left wing minorities. As it has developed historically, the territorial survey type of
apportionment has granted, certainly, a disproportionate emphasis to localisms and
especially to local property interests, but it has also been a rather loose kind of

apportionment by contrast to other types and has permitted other criteria to be
developed within its confines.
The unofficial apportionment that occurs within the legal system of apportionment
is not the only change any legal system may be expected to undergo. Habituating
themselves to the requirements of the law, various interests may work into the territorial system itself and derive benefit therefrom. A prominent historical example
is the entrance of the commercial classes in England into the territorial apportion-

ment system through the purchase of land.j' By the time the rotten boroughs of
England were eliminated in the nineteenth century, the major commercial interests
were fairly well spoken for from seats in the Commons that they had previously
acquired by purchase. And the House of Lords was composed in part of men who
had risen in commerce and industry and had been granted tides for one reason
or another. The present interests of the urban centers of the American states are
diffuse and only indirectly involved in the rotten borough condition, so it cannot
be expected that they would become engaged in a direct intervention in country
elections. Yet the urban interests are not rendered helpless by malapportionment and
" E. PENDLETON HmuNG, GRoup REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS 47, 50 (1929).
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actually an urban political organization often bargains effectively for the city's
interests with the rural representatives.
To suggest another case in which one type of apportionment may be transformed into another type by external forces, one may point to the careers of various
kinds of proportional representation. Whereas the nineteenth century inventors of
proportional representation viewed their work as fostering individualism and freedom of action in representative government, a major consequence of proportional
representation has been the increase in cohesiveness of political groupings. Every
effort is exerted to organize and discipline a quota of voters. The Europeans, with
have faced this fact and radically
their list of systems of proportional representation,
7
reduced non-partisanship in elections.'
Finally, it must be realized that, since apportionment is only one stage of the
process of representation, values that are blocked entrance into politics on that level
may seek and find other levels at which they may enter and be counted. To illustrate
what is meant by this point, we may depict the various levels of the process of representation at which the substitution of a value denied elsewhere may occur. A
group of small businessmen, engaged in commerce and trade, would tend over a
period of time to favor a system of apportionment, which, while in part based on
territorial survey, would provide some disproportionate influence to those who pay
more than average taxes. An arrangement such as that contained in the French
Constitution of 1793 or the pre-World War Prussian system might be satisfactory.
But if this were denied them, they could seek other means of influencing the structure
of the representative system. They might seek property, tax, residence, or educational restrictions on the franchise. They might fight vigorously against limiting
the franchise to land-holders. They might agitate also against limiting legislative
candidacies to possessors of land, but might favor limiting candidacies to propertyholders. They might seek to place all major financial officers of the government
upon the ballot, rather than limiting the election to top political officers alone.
They might not favor strongly the secret ballot, since secrecy would deny them
the opportunity to form opinions about the votes of those economically dependent
upon them. They might well be puzzled by the kind of election system to prefer,
since the workings of the majority system depend so much on the character of the
franchise and the party system. Under a severely limited franchise, they might well
prefer a majority or plurality system of election, as did the American merchants of
the Revolutionary Period. On the other hand, they would be generally unfavorable
to any system that could allow more numerous groups than they to possess mandated or instructed representatives, whether such a system be of the plurality type
or of proportional representation. They might well favor any or all of the numerous
devices to limit the election system to certain kinds of decisions. Thus they might
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prefer financial referenda if experience demonstrated such referenda to be free of
mass controls. They might also favor bicameralism, uninstructed representatives,
checking organs of government such as an appointed judiciary, or other devices to
mitigate the effects of a universal suffrage. In short, every step of the process of
representation would present arrangements that might or might not be specially
arranged to their advantage. Other social interests, such as a group of coal miners
or a learned profession, might behave similarly. History, to be sure, rarely shows
cases of such complete addiction of any specific group to the total process of representation, but numerous groups have behaved analogously to the hypothetical case
with respect to several stages. 8 And at any given point in time, when one examines
the struggle centered about any particular feature of representative government, he
finds a welter of interests engaged in determining the shape an existing or proposed channel of influence is to assume. It is in this sense that apportionment must
take its place alongside numerous other variables that all together determine the
long-range policy output of the government.
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